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ABSTRACT
While there is some scholarship in management and organization studies on forms of organized violence, 
it has rarely focused on the role of organized violence within wider business-society and governance 
relations. In this article, we argue that conceptualizing the role and capacity of the state is still paramount, 
precisely because it is normally the state that holds a monopoly on violence. Yet, this state monopoly has 
continuously been eroded as private firms and civil society actors are increasingly involved in 
paramilitaries, trafficking, mafia-like and terrorist organizing and other forms of organized violence. To 
help management and organization scholars appreciate and make sense of these dynamics in 
contemporary economic affairs, this article puts forward a conceptualization of business-society relations 






























































of organized violence. We develop six propositions that seek to understand organized violence within, 
what we call, the ‘governance triangle’ of state-firm-civil society relations. These propositions give rise 
to three ‘doomsday scenarios’: 1) Rise of military dictatorships; 2) Rise of private security monopolies 
and oligopolies; 3) Rise of civil wars. We conclude the article by outlining the implications of such a 
violence-based view for management and organization scholars.
Keywords: organized violence, monopoly of violence, business-society relations, state-firm 
dynamics
INTRODUCTION
Some analysts argue that we have been witnessing a steady decline of wars and armed conflict since 
World War II, which is largely thanks to a stable global geo-political order and the relative strength of 
political and state institutional setups associated with the global rise of parliamentary democracies and 
liberal capitalist regimes (Goldstein, 2011; Bloomfield et al., 2017). Indeed, homicide rates in many 
countries seem to be at the lowest level since official statistics began (Roser, 2018). Others are not so 
sure. Malešević (2017) emphatically argues that organized military violence is ripe even in the 21st century, 
although the nature of armed conflict has changed. He argues that, on the one hand, national states and 
their armed forces now have more organizational and technological capacity and capabilities than ever 
before. On the other hand, however, the rise of liberal trade regimes, benefiting globally operating 
economic actors, have undermined “the sovereignty of many states, which ultimately can lead to the loss 
of the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the emergence of paramilitary warlords capable 
of privatizing coercive power” (Malešević, 2017, p. 458). 
While there is some appreciation of the role of organized violence in contemporary regimes of 
management and organization (Costas & Grey, 2018; Wood & Wright, 2015; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015; 
Crane, 2013; Harrington et al., 2015; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Doh et al., 2003), these have rarely taken 
wider business-society and governance relations into account. In this article, we develop six propositions 
that point to the changing governance relations between state, firm and civil society actors, showing that 
dynamics of organized violence are at their center. Given the fast-paced changes and contemporary 






























































social, economic and environmental challenges faced worldwide - political violence, terrorist activism, 
rapid climate change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values, rise of authoritarianism, to name but a few 
(Dryzek, 2013; Dannreuther, 2014; Giroux, 2018) - we argue it to be of extreme importance for 
management and organizational scholars to understand these dynamics of organized violence, being 
aware of possible violent ‘doomsday scenarios’ that may become reality in the not too distant future, if 
they do not exist in some parts of the world already. Based on our analysis, we develop three such 
‘doomsday scenarios’ that represent extreme versions of the firm-state-civil society governance dynamics 
of organized violence. 
This article contributes to our understanding of business-society relations by highlighting the need 
for a governance of organized violence perspective. All too often firm-state-civil society relations are 
dominated by CSR and other ‘win-win’ perspectives (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001), neglecting the often violent nature of governance relations. In times of rapid social, economic and 
environmental changes, we argue that such a violence-based view may be important if we appreciate that 
there might be increased struggles for natural resources, political recognition and legitimacy of business 
activity (McFate, 2017). This article also aims to contribute to the debate of the role of the state and 
private actors to protect and enhance fundamental human, economic, political and environmental rights. 
Often neglected in management and organization studies, we put forward a violence-based view of 
business-society relations, which, we argue, is of importance and significance for businesses, 
policymakers and civil society in a world that is seemingly becoming more polarized, disorganized and 
violent.
THE STATE MONOPOLY OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE AND ITS PRIVATIZATION 
Violence is a long-lived, pervasive, ubiquitous and multifaceted way of organizing and managing 
economic and social activities (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). Violence in organizational settings is often 
associated with the use of actual or potential physical or symbolic force and coercive power by an 
individual or an organization (Costas & Grey, 2018). The use of violence in organizations can be 
legitimate or not, be perpetrated explicitly or implicitly, and it can be physical, symbolic or structural 






























































(Kilby, 2013). Organizational and managerial practices relying on the use of violence - which can simply 
be defined as ‘organized violence’ - may take various forms, such as victimizing, corrupting, intimidating, 
bullying, extorting, coercing, abusing and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013). As such, organized 
violence is manifested at various interpersonal, organizational or structural/societal levels, for example 
regulating social and economic activities among and between peers, competitors, customers, and being 
shaped by specific institutions (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015) and social relations  (Costas & Grey, 2018).
Regardless of its specific definition or manifestation, organized violence can be understood as a 
strategic resource for any actor aiming at organizing and managing economic and social activities. In modern 
states the use of organized violence by private actors, like firms or civil society, is not allowed nor 
tolerated: political, social and economic violence is considered as an illicit and illegal practice which ought 
to be persecuted and eradicated (Wulf, 2011). State persecution of all forms of illegitimate violence 
constitutes one of the elements of the social contract between the state and its citizens (Acemoglu et al., 
2013). The key word is ‘legitimate’, as the state has a monopoly over deciding what constitutes legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of violence (Fukuyama, 2007). The state, in fact, uses the law and its legal apparatus 
to legitimize its own use of organized violence in the form of armies, police and state security forces. For 
example, a state government can legitimately deploy police forces to disperse street protesters if the 
security of the wider population is in jeopardy. A private firm or NGO cannot. From a historical 
perspective, it can be argued that the process of establishing, supporting and maintain a ‘monopoly of 
violence’ legitimates the presence of the state and its very existence (Weber, 1946).
Yet, this monopoly can be under threat. The state can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of 
violence due to its geography. For example, some regions are difficult to access and control and different 
ethnic groups may claim the legitimate use of violence. There may also be socio-economic reasons, such 
as the lack of resources to organize an army/police force and the presence of income inequality, which 
can all challenge the state’s legitimacy to the use of violence (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Moreover, the state 
can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of violence as part of a political process in which non-state 
(e.g. firm-based) organized violence is tolerated, allowed or even encouraged, for example by 
authoritarian or corrupted elites, and/or ethnic groups (Acemoglu et al., 2013). 






























































Wulf (2011) has identified the ‘privatization of violence’, i.e. the process of outsourcing the control 
of organized violence, as a key element that has shaped state-firm dynamics over the last few decades. 
Particularly two main dynamics of the privatization of violence seem to prevail (Wulf, 2011; Acemoglu 
et al., 2013): on the one hand, bottom-up privatization mechanisms, often related to ‘weak and fragile 
capabilities’ to defend the state monopoly; on the other hand, top-down privatization mechanisms in which 
the state has developed ‘new capabilities’ and consequently outsourced the control of organized violence 
to other actors, particularly private firms. Wulf (2011, p. 138) argues that a bottom-up privatization of 
organized violence can be due to the state’s failure to guarantee law and order at the advantage of 
organized crime, warlords, militias and criminal gangs. This is becoming an increasing challenge in a 
world that is facing continuous and unprecedented political, socio-economic and environmental crises 
(Enamorado et al., 2016). For example, organizations such as Russian mobsters, Eastern European crime 
rings, African drug trafficking and financial scamming groups, Chinese Tongs, Japanese Yakuza and 
Boryokuda, and Middle Eastern organizations connected with declared jihadist groups have all become 
prominent actors today (Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). These groups profit from the manipulation and 
monopolization of legitimate markets, institutions and industries as well as from black markets and 
illegitimate practices, e.g. illicit drug trade and human trafficking. They rely on tools of violence, 
corruption, bribes, graft, extortion, intimidation, and murder to maintain their respective operations and 
control their market profits (Kleemans, 2007; Costa, 2010; FBI, 2015). 
Top-down privatization mechanisms, on the other hand, are characterized by the proactive 
reorganization of the state and the emergence of private armies, security corps, and pro-government 
militias (Carey et al., 2013; Heinisch & Mandel, 2002; Wood & Wright, 2015). Resources that are seen to 
be of strategic importance for states, such as large mining operations, power stations and other key 
infrastructure, are increasingly secured by private armies and police forces. Private firms are also running 
prisons and a range of other security forces, acting in the interest of the state (Genders, 2002; Wood & 
Wright, 2015; Alonso & Andrews, 2016). In fact, companies with large-scale, land-based operations often 
have their own security forces, as there is an increasingly fierce battle to exploiting the remaining natural 
resources of the planet (Borras et al., 2012).  






























































Regardless of their differences, both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms can be seen as part of 
a wider transformation of states’ capabilities to managing strategic public assets in a context of rising 
(neo-)liberal and globalized market regimes (Wood and Wright, 2015). Parallel to this transformation, 
there is an increasing activism of multinational corporations, such that various analysts have claimed that 
state institutions may have less capacity and willingness to implement and monitor laws and public 
control on strategic assets within their jurisdiction (Kaldor, 2007). Moreover, illicit and criminal 
organizations, as well as warlords, para-military, political and/or ideology-driven, violent groups are 
constantly strategizing for undermining the state’s capabilities to control organized violence. In short, 
the state seems to have lost power and/or redefined its capabilities as an institutional actor, which means 
that it is perhaps not in full control of its own monopoly of organized violence anymore (Malešević, 
2017). However, whether the loss of control is due to bottom-up or top-down mechanisms, this 
approach may create a too narrow view of the governance processes shaping the privatization of 
organized violence. What seems particularly neglected in this perspective is the role of other societal 
stakeholders as well as the dynamic relationships between firms, states and civil society actors. Therefore, 
we argue that it is important to develop a broader understanding of the privatization of organized 
violence, taking into account wider governance dynamics.
BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: FIRMS, STATES AND THE GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE 
OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE
Privatization is only one of the dynamics involving the role of the state and private firms in economic 
activities. For more than three decades now, it has been argued that state-firm dynamics need to involve 
a robust appreciation of the vital role of multiple stakeholders, in a wider state-firm-civil society relational 
perspective (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Phillips, 2002). As 
early as in 1983, Freeman and Reed (1983) put forward the need to go beyond the sole focus of corporate 
managing of shareholders, decisively moving towards, what can be called, ‘stakeholder capitalism’ 
(Freeman et al., 2007). Their now well-rehearsed argument has been that the firm does not only have 
responsibility towards its shareholders and their financial expectations but indeed responsibilities towards 






























































a broader set of internal and external stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers, 
communities, civil society organizations, governments and others. This has resulted in a burgeoning 
literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001; Matten & Crane, 2005).
The emerging literature on ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer et al., 2014) has 
gone further, arguing that this increased focus on firm’s wider societal responsibility has been an 
important political moment, as governments around the world have had less capacity – or have shown 
less willingness – to address, and legislate for, social and environmental problems. This has been called 
the ‘privatization of governance’ or ‘private regulation’ (Brammer et al., 2012; Vogel, 2010). While this 
political move towards private regulation has been widely accepted, there is a body of literature that 
argues that the role of the state has been too under-represented by management scholars (Yamak & Süer, 
2005; Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004; Moon & Vogel, 2008; Bendell et al., 2010; Fassin, 2009; Gond et al., 
2011; Schrempf-Stirling, 2018; Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). While the role of governments has certainly 
changed, these authors argue that the state has far from disappeared. It many parts of the world, for 
example, governments have been much more interventionist in their industrial policy (Coates, 2005). 
China’s rapid capitalist development in the past 30 years has been highly directed from the top of the 
Communist State (Dickson, 2003). Even in Anglo-Saxon and so-called neoliberal contexts of the West, 
governmental institutions still matter, and always have (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). For example, when 
governments are implementing public-private partnerships – often involving large-scale infrastructure 
projects – elaborate legal frameworks have to be in place to secure the workings of these often long-term 
contracts between states and private sector actors (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Kwak et al., 2009). 
Neoliberalism and private regulation, it is argued, cannot take place without the state (Jessop, 2002). 
Instead of arguing for a one-directional perspective of privatization, a range of authors have 
emphasized the changing dynamics of relations between government, business and civil society. Steurer 
(2013), for example, shows how governmental deregulation has been accompanied by soft governmental 
regulation as well as ‘societal re-regulation’. Here, the state does not simply disappear but is entangled in 
a complex web of changing power relations that lead to different outcomes across time and space. Such 






























































a perspective requires detailed studies of the dynamic, triangular interactions between state, corporate 
and civil society actors, involving mechanisms of political maneuvering, interest alignment and alliance 
building (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et al., 2018; Midttun, 2005). What we are, hence, dealing with is, what 
Abbott & Snidal (2009) call, a ‘governance triangle’. 
[Insert Figure 1]
This triangle features different modes of regulation, including ‘hard regulation’ by the state, 
‘industry self-regulation’ by business, and ‘civil regulation’ by civil society actors (Steurer, 2013, p. 395). 
These regulatory modes are not necessarily stable, but marked by continuous struggles over differing 
interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018). These conflicts are well documented in the 
literature (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Surroca et al., 2013) with authors showing how disagreements and 
different interests between firm, state and civil society actors often involve struggles over identity (Bruijn 
& Whiteman, 2010), recognition (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015) and access to resources, such as land 
(Banerjee, 2011a).
However, what is perhaps less appreciated in the current literature - although there are exceptions 
(e.g. Kraemer et al., 2013) - is that these conflicts can also involve violence, and more precisely organized 
violence. As indicated in Figure 2 and discussed above, the current debate on the privatization of 
organized violence revolves around only two specific governance dynamics involving state-firm-society 
relations. Specifically, bottom-up privatization mechanisms are seen in the literature as a governance 
response of the state to civil society pressures, and top-down privatization mechanisms are new 
governance responses to the perceived need to outsource the control of strategic assets to private firms. 
What we have discussed in this section is that this privatization-of-violence view may be too limited. 
There is a need to appreciate the wider governance dynamics at play, involving a complex array of firm, 
state and civil society actors and their often violent relationships. We will now further elaborate on this 
approach and widen our perspective on a violence-based view of business-society relations using a 
governance triangle perspective, while, first, we briefly discuss our methodological approach. 
































































Adopting an inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing (Gioia et., 2013; Gehman et al., 2018), 
our main objective has been to understand contemporary forms of violence in governance relations, and 
theorizing the changes in firm-state-civil society relations of organized violence (Langley 2009; Langley 
et al. 2013). Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security 
studies, political theory and international relations, we have developed conceptual propositions forming 
a theoretical framework of organized violence that focuses on the dynamic relations between state 
institutions, private firms and civil society actors (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1]
Rather than a systematic literature review, we have purposively selected academic reports and 
manuscripts engaging with the conception of firm-society relations as a dynamic and constantly changing 
process of ‘governance making’ in which the three main actors, state, firm and civil society, have differing 
interests, goals and objectives. From the selected sources, all academic sources have been categorized 
and coded to delineate the different governance processes of the three main actors in the governance 
framework. We have identified a set of codes related to core tensions and pressures arising between these 
actors, as well as a set of codes referring to core challenges, resolved in the emergence or shift of the 
control of violence in the governance triangle. Based on this perspective, we have developed six 
propositions that constitute, we propose, the key violence-based governance dynamics in business-
society relations. Based on these six propositions we have finally identified three main doomsday 
scenarios. 
TOWARDS A VIOLENCE-BASED VIEW OF BUSINESS-SOCIETY RELATIONS






























































In this section, we first present our findings related to a violence-based view of business-society relations 
represented by six key conceptual propositions. Figure 3 represents the dynamic relations between our 
conceptual propositions, in the attempt to enlarge and problematize the governance triangle presented 
in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 3]
Proposition 1a: Outsourcing of violence and security to firms
This proposition summarizes what has been already discussed in the debate on top-down privatization 
dynamics in which states are using private firms to organize, deliver and control its monopoly of violence 
and/or turn a blind eye to the violation of state laws by private firms (Volkov, 2016). In the above, we 
have identified an important tendency for the state to increasingly face economic and social incentives 
to ‘privatize’ and liberalize the monopoly of violence, and to include new private economic actors to 
deliver security services, protect human rights, and support its geo-political interests (Kinsey, 2006; 
Alonso & Andrews, 2016; McFate, 2017). This is due to either the rising of complexity in society on how 
to manage control and order, or to a political shift towards the privatization of public and common assets 
like social security and protection. Hence, private economic actors are more often legitimized to lead the 
control of organized violence, pushing for further liberalization and ‘outsourcing’ of security services 
(Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010). The nascent private military industry, private-owned 
or controlled prisons and private security forces are few examples of a fast-growing business context and 
marketplace based on organized violence (Avant, 2005). 
However, another form of outsourcing of violence and security is when states do not have the 
capacity to challenge any violation of their laws; or states are deliberating tolerating it (Volkov, 2016). 
Examples include large-scale private investments in strategic industries, such as oil, gas and mining, where 
states have a strategic interest in working with private firms to develop and extract these resources. Often, 
however, these industries then operate outside any regime of public scrutiny of work conditions and 
environmental impacts (Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov, 2016). This also refers to the case when 






























































corporations adopt illegal practices in the workplace or exploit natural resources without being 
sanctioned by the state, or when they are bribing or corrupting key public officers to gain a license to 
operate in illicit markets (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017). 
Proposition 1b: Deployment of state armies and security forces (against civil society)
This proposition is about the increasing use of state armies and security forces against civil society actors, 
often done in an illegitimate way (Clarke, 2010; Beckman, 2016). One could also call this the illegitimate 
use of the state’s monopoly of violence. The core pressures here are arising from an increase or 
persistence of political instability and social unrest, for example leading the state to pursuit a political 
agenda to repress minorities/ suppress human/ democratic rights, or the need to respond to exogenous 
shocks (e.g. climate change, terrorist attacks, conflicts with other state(s) or internal guerrillas, 
pandemics), leading the state to quickly react to unforeseen circumstances and events. There are 
increasing concerns that the freedom of speech is curtailed in even liberal, democratic societies (House, 
2014). The threat of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, directed at the state, is often used by state institutions 
to legitimize unprecedented increases in the powers of the police, the army and the state’s legal system 
to deal with such ‘states of emergencies’ (Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). There is an extensive literature 
about how, in the post-9-11 world, the freedom of expression and organization has been curtailed by 
governments around the world (Epifanio, 2011). 
Yet, this goes beyond anti-terrorist measures. As already mentioned above, states often support 
large-scale development projects, such as dams, oil and gas installations, mines and power stations, which 
will not only benefit private interests but are seen to be of strategic importance for nations’ development 
(Martinez-Alier, 2001; Obi, 2010; Maher et al., 2019). When communities resist such large-scale projects, 
for example because they feel their livelihoods are threatened, then often the violent force of the state is 
mobilized to deal with the resisting communities (Dunlap, 2019). Banerjee argues that so-called ‘spaces 
of exception’ are actively created by state authorities to push through strategic projects and crush civil 
society resistance: “Violence, torture, and death can occur in this space of exception without political or 
juridical intervention. The state of exception thus creates a zone where the application of law is 






























































suspended but the law remains in force” (2008, p. 1544). For example, in the mining conflicts they study 
in Chile, Maher et al. (2019) show how violence is used as a strategic resource mobilized by the state to 
support national development projects, delivered by large multinational mining companies. 
Proposition 2a: ‘Mafia-like’ economic organizations
While, up until the 1950s, the mafioso was considered to be a ‘man of honour’, the Italian mafia can 
increasingly be considered as a rational economic actor, “combining modern entrepreneurial activities in 
the legal sector with traditional cultural values which give Mafia firms important competitive advantages 
over their rivals” (Chubb, 1996, p. 275). Some of the Italian Mafia practices Chubb mentions are the 
“discouragement of competition, holding down of wages, reserves of liquidity from illegal activities 
which can be reinvested in the legal sector” (ibid.). Yet, it is clear that such business practices are now 
commonplace, exercised and perpetrated by the criminal, illegal and violent economic activities of 
organized crime gangs globally (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012; Albanese, 2014), using tactics based on 
victimizing, abusing, corrupting, intimidating and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013; Riccardi, 2014; 
Chin, 2016). Mafia organizations often specialize in black market and other illegal or semi-legal economic 
activities, such as weapons dealing, organized prostitution, drug trafficking, smuggling and tax evasion 
(Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). Their business empires are considered to be spanning the entire globe, 
while there is particular emphasis on transferring proceeds from illegal activities to legitimate businesses 
through money laundering (Lavorgna, 2015). 
Private economic organizations acting as ‘Mafia’ organized crime may emerge when there is an 
increased interest of organized crime to control socio-economic activities/assets in key regions or 
sectors, for example due to weak/fragile political and institutional conditions, or when there is an 
increased capacity of these organizations to influence political arenas and institutions. Mafia or mafia-
like organizations often use state institutions to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese, 
2014), for example by corrupting civil servants and politicians, and/or setting up public-private 
enterprises operating at the edge of legal and illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016). 
In this way, they increasingly violate the state’s monopoly of violence by weakening and corrupting its 






























































capacity to control. In some cases the mafia acts even on behalf of the state (Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012; 
Lavorgna, 2015). Some authors argue that in a world that is facing continuous and unprecedented 
political, socio-economic and environmental crises, we will see a rise of mafia-like economic practices 
(Enamorado et al., 2016).
Proposition 2b: Deployment of private security forces and division of resistance
As shown in Table 1, an increased interest of private businesses to control socio-economic 
activities/assets in key regions or sectors or the need to respond to social unrest, political instability and 
institutional uncertainty can lead private firms to be legally entitled and legitimized to exert a monopoly 
of violence in certain regions or sectors. Private firms receive economic and political powers from the 
state as part of a political agenda to use of violence by private firms against civil society (Brock & Dunlap, 
2018). These practices include bullying, intimidation, divide and conquer deployment of private security 
forces and other approaches that could be deemed violent (Sampat, 2015; Dunlap, 2019; Maher, et al., 
2019). Whereas the public image of firms is one that is dominated by CSR and other ‘win-win’ 
approaches, there is often a hidden, secret agenda to the way companies go about dealing with resisting 
civil society groups, including NGOs, indigenous people and communities (Newell, 2005; Banerjee, 
2011b; Sampat, 2015). Kraemer et al. (2013), for example, document this hybrid approach in a mining 
conflict in India, where, on the one hand, the mining company tries to establish a partnership with the 
local community, while, on the other hand, deploys violent measures against protesters. Equally, Hönke 
(2013) shows how companies often make large investments into local communities, while also using 
private security forces to coercively protect their turf. Such private security practices are often not 
possible without the, at least tacit, approval by the state. That is, either states do not have the capacity or 
willingness to protect people’s freedom to protest, often giving private companies a free reign in dealing 
with what is perceived to be ‘uncivil’ society (Sullivan et al., 2011). 
Proposition 3a: Guerrilla warfare and terrorist organizations






























































Increased political, cultural and/or religious struggles in society between classes, groups or minorities, or 
a raise of economic inequality and social unrest, collective fear or distrust for public authorities and 
political organizations can lead groups in society, such political parties or ethnic minorities to question 
the state capacity or legitimacy to maintain and enforce a shared social contract. This is also exacerbated 
by the presence of economic, social and/or cultural elites directly control the state. Whereas most civil 
society groups, including NGOs, community groups, etc. use non-violent tactics to resist the state and 
its regime of power and control, there are also groups that specialize in using strategic violence to further 
their aims and objectives (Gupta, 2008; Khalil, 2013). The most-talked about violent civil society groups 
have been jihadist terrorist cells and militia, such as al-Qaida, ISIS and others (Clutterbuck, 2003; 
Stepanova, 2008). There are many theories trying to explain why civil society activism for social and 
political change turns into violent radicalism and extremism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010). Some authors highlight social inequalities that have increased exponentially under 
neoliberal globalization and the contingent institutional and class responses to them (Sandbrook & 
Romano, 2004). Others emphasize psychological factors (Loza, 2007). 
Whatever the reasons for the recent surge in terrorist activity worldwide, civil society groups have 
always used violent tactics, including guerrilla warfare, to make themselves heard, defend territories or 
resources and fight for recognition as well as social and political change (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Examples 
include the Maoists in India and Nepal, the IRA in Ireland, among others (Sharma, 2004; Shah, 2013; 
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007), which have been fighting against regional and central governments to follow 
their ideological interests. However, as Shah (2006) points out, there is not always a clear distinction 
between state and violent civil society group, as both actors can be seen to compete in, what can be 
called, the ‘market of protection’. That is, as the state’s monopoly of violence is watered down, violent 
civil society groups can step in to provide security and protection for the population.
Proposition 3b: Mobilization of violent resistance (against corporations)
As highlighted in Table 1, increased needs for social and economic justice and/or political representation, 
as well as social response to scandals or misconducts perpetrated by private businesses can lead civil 






























































society actors to act and try to directly ensure and provide social security, income redistribution, voice, 
and  ‘safety nets’ to citizens in opposition to the state and private firms. Civil society actors can be forced 
to control and monitor private businesses’ operations due to lack of capacity or interest from the state. 
Therefore, just as violent resistance can be targeted at state institutions and forces, it can also be targeted 
at private firms, particularly those that are engaged in large-scale economic development projects, such 
as mines, oil and gas extraction, hydropower dams and forest plantations. Such large-scale projects often 
displace large amounts of people, particularly peasants, farmers, and indigenous people - those who 
depend on the land for their livelihoods and spirituality (Taylor, 2011; Verweijen, 2017). Violent 
resistance against firms hence can be particularly encountered in struggles over land, given that basic 
livelihoods are at stake. There are many examples of land-based communities - particularly in Global 
South countries - encountering evictions from their land, as extractive industries - often with the tacit or 
explicit approval by state authorities - start digging for coal, oil, gas or minerals (Obi, 2010; Pedersen, 
2014). Even within agricultural and forestry settings, indigenous people have been evicted as their land 
is being included in global agricultural commodity chains and carbon markets (Gerber, 2011; Lyons & 
Westoby, 2014). These are examples of dispossessions and land grabbing that these communities resist, 
sometimes using violent tactics, in order to defend their land.
DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE 
In a world characterized by increasing systemic and complex crises, so-called grand challenges or wicked 
problems, an extended understanding of violence-based governance dynamics in business-society 
relations can help scholars and practitioners to engage in a richer and more informed sense-making of 
future scenarios. Based on our conceptual propositions, outlined in the previous section and Table 1, we 
now elaborate on a violence-based view of business-society relations, developing ‘ideal typical’ doomsday 
scenarios of organized violence. In our approach, an ‘ideal type’ doomsday scenario of organized violence 
is identified as a specific configuration of the firm-state-civil society relations, when the core tensions, 
pressures and challenges pushed out of balance these dynamics, such that one of the actors takes control 
of violence, establishing a new ‘monopoly’ or reinforcing an existing one. An extreme environmental 






























































crisis, for example, a world of extreme climate conditions, or socio-economic collapse, due to global 
spread of a new contagious disease, a nuclear disaster or conflict, a systematic technology breakdown - 
these are all events that can trigger a violent radicalization of contemporary governance relations, 
allowing one of the actors take control of the monopoly of violence. Based on our inductive and 
interpretative approach to theorizing, summarized in Table 1, we have identified the following doomsday 
scenarios (see Figure 4): (1) the rise of state-based authoritarianism based on novel forms of military 
dictatorships; (2) the rise of new monopolies or oligopolies of organized violence managed by private 
firms; and (3) the rise of systemic and epidemic civil wars orchestrated by violent civil society 
organizations at regional or global scale.
[Insert Figure 4]
Doomsday scenario 1: Rise of military dictatorships
Based on our reading and coding of an interdisciplinary set of literature, our inductive theorizing has 
revealed a scenario in which states might reclaim control of organized violence and systematically limit 
the activities of civil society and private firms, establishing new forms of dictatorships, for example by 
the use of coercion through state-controlled police and military forces. State authoritarianism – and 
military dictatorships as their most extreme version – may emerge as a response to increasingly severe 
geo-political instability, rapid disease outbreaks, climate disasters and unpredictable social and political 
turmoil, all triggering the need for more state control and use of organized violence (Grint, 2010; 
Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). This process may emerge either through an increased state capacity and 
need to limit private actors’ activities, for example by limiting any private initiatives in the military, police 
and security sectors, revising and limiting any outsourcing process and by ‘re-nationalising’ the 
governance of public assets, including social security through organized violence (Epifanio, 2011); or by 
a full alignment between corporate and state interests and power. Novel, violence-based forms of state 
authoritarianism emerge at the expense of civil society voices and democratic rights as well as by reducing 
or abolishing any liberal rights (Clarke, 2010; Giroux, 2018; Volkov, 2016). The emergence of Trump 






























































and other populist governments (Fuchs, 2017) as well as the rise of China as a significant economic and 
geopolitical force (Ma, 2009) has already fueled debates about an ‘authoritarian capitalism’ that has taken 
hold around the world (Witt & Redding, 2014). This doomsday scenario predicts that these developments 
might accelerate – particularly in times of major economic, health, social and environmental crises – 
leading to the rise of extreme versions of state authoritarianism, for example military dictatorships. 
Doomsday scenario 2: Rise of private security monopolies and oligopolies
Our inductive theorizing has given rise to quite a different scenario; one that predicts extreme versions 
of privatized forms of organized violence, deregulated and even encouraged by states. This depicts a 
future in which the state is ‘systematically outsourcing’ control and legitimization of organized violence 
to private economic actors. This process is supported by a progressive control of states’ functions by 
violent organizations, for example through their increased capacity to be represented in state institutions 
and to use them to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese, 2014). The state’s 
capabilities are fully controlled by private actors, systematically using violent practices, for example by 
corrupting civil servants and politicians, and legitimized to operate in illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin, 
2016; Volkov, 2016). The full collapse of the state’s monopoly of organized violence is accompanied by 
the emergence of new monopolies and oligopolies in which democratic control of such organized 
violence will be limited or completely absent. This can lead to increased lawlessness and a ‘wild-west’ 
neoliberal capitalism, which is fully focused on producing wealth for a small minority of private business 
elites. This scenario also depicts a future of organized crime led by violent organizations, like the mafia, 
specialized in business operations such as human trafficking, modern slavery, and private economic 
organizations being directly or indirectly dependent on such organized crime (Kleemans, 2007). This 
process includes the rise of private armies and warlords, with proxy wars being fought entirely by private 
security forces. Part of this scenario is the prediction that states will be increasingly called upon to cover 
large-scale health, economic, social and environmental risks, leading to extreme indebtedness and further 
reduced capacity of the state to regulate and fund social security and welfare programs. As the global 
financial crisis has shown (Kolb, 2010), large-scale, state-funded rescue packages can lead to, what is 






























































called, a socialization of risk, contributing to extreme income and wealth gaps in society (Lee & 
Woodward, 2012). 
Doomsday scenario 3: Rise of civil wars 
We might also witness states increasingly incapable or unwilling to legislate against organized violence, 
which will lead to increased lawlessness and the exponential increase of ‘uncivil society’ actors, including 
terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups. In this scenario, democratic rights and duties as well as civil 
liberties have been abolished, as the governance space is dominated by violent civil society organizations 
emerging in an unregulated society. Both, states and firms, will increasingly have difficulty in controlling 
any monopoly of organized violence, leading to lawlessness and civil war-like social conditions. In this 
scenario, disorganized, uncoordinated, non-controlled violence becomes (again) the central trait of how 
society works, resembling pre-modern state dynamics (Bloomfield et al., 2017). It is likely that groups 
that dominate this scenario, i.e. terrorist and guerilla organizations, establish symbiotic and violent 
relations with private economic actors, which dominate scenario 2. Hence, terrorists, guerrillas, warlords, 
mafia firms and their mercenaries are likely to be engaged in direct or proxy warfare with each other, 
fighting for regional or global control of the governance space of organized violence.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have conceptualized firm-state-civil society relations through the lens of business-
society governance of organized violence. Our inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing has 
presented an ‘extreme’ perspective on business-society governance in which doomsday scenarios of 
violence-based governance mechanisms emerge in response to social and environmental crises, such as 
rapid climate change or outbreaks of contagious diseases. In this concluding section, let us reflect about 
the implications of our analysis for management practitioners and scholars. 
We should, above all, highlight that, while this article has conceptualized a governance triangle 
of business-society relations, involving firms, states and civil society actors, ‘management’ cannot be 
reduced to processes and structures in the domain of firms. Understanding governance as a continuous 






























































struggle over differing interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018) also implies that 
‘management’ should be understood as a dynamic relationship between firms, state and civil society 
actors. As stakeholder theorists (Freeman et al., 2007) and political CSR scholars (Scherer et al., 2014) 
have argued for a while, management can be seen as a third space in the dynamic interactions between a 
range of different societal actors. Building on these understandings, the purpose of this article has been 
to show that these business-society relations are by no means always following ‘win-win’ scenarios. On 
the contrary, these relations should be understood as conflictual, involving violence and, more precisely, 
organized violence. Our goal has hence been to read an interdisciplinary set of literatures to conceptualize 
business-society relations as a dynamic process of organized violence, giving rise to a range of doomsday 
scenarios that may or may not already be visible in contemporary society. We argue that anyone involved 
in the management and governance of business-society relations should take note of these possible 
scenarios that paint a bleak, but possible, picture of contemporary and future society. The doomsday 
scenarios that have emerged out our inductive reading and theorizing are by no means inevitable. As we 
have emphasized through this article, relations between firms, states and civil society will always involve 
contestations and struggles, producing a range of different outcomes. It is our hope that our analysis 
contributes affirmatively to these contestations, providing societal actors with conceptual tools to 
critically analyze business-society relations and enabling more just and ethical futures to emerge. This 
also implies that managers of governance relations can be a force for good. If they are aware of the 
doomsday scenarios of the future analyzed in this paper, it would be our hope that they are able to shift 
the balance of power with the governance triangle, helping to avert the worst potential outcomes in 
relation to more distributed violence capabilities. 
In conclusion, let us outline the three main contributions this article makes to the management 
and organization studies literature:
First, we have argued that firms are embedded in dynamic governance relations, which are not 
always defined by so-called ‘win-wins’ (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). That 
is, the relations between states, firms and civil society actors are not necessarily harmonious or stable. 
On the contrary, they are very dynamic and often determined by conflict (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et 






























































al., 2018; Midttun, 2005) as well as sensitive to pressures from systemic and global socio-economic and 
environmental crises. Building on this extant literature, we have suggested the idea that these conflicts 
can also involve violence, and more precisely organized violence (Kraemer et al., 2013; Banerjee, 
2011a,b).
Second, we have argued that the privatization-of-violence view (Wulf, 2011) may be too limited, 
proposing, instead, a violence-based view of business-society relations, using a governance triangle 
perspective. In other words, our approach problematizes the idea that the state has a monopoly of 
organized violence that can be altered either by transferring functions and capabilities to private firms or 
by the emergence of civil society actors. Instead, basing our argument on an interdisciplinary set of 
literatures, we have developed six propositions that show the complex and dynamic relations of 
organized violence between states, firms and civil society.
Third, key to our approach is the idea that organized violence is a strategic asset that triggers 
conflictual views and interests, and can be subject to processes of commodification, and thus be 
mobilized and traded as any other strategic asset in a neo-liberal world. In line with this view, Barros 
(2012, p. 56) sees “violence itself a commodity-form”, which he calls ‘security’, highlighting that we can 
formalize “security as a marketable commodity [...]. Thus, if security is a marketable commodity 
expressible economically, then it is possible to refer to security goods and security trades as variables of 
the system”. In our approach, we have identified key dynamics shaping this process and enlarged the 
spectrum of actors involved. 
Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security 
studies, political theory and international relations, we have presented a first attempt to conceptualize 
the governance of organized violence and violence-based doomsday scenarios, focusing on the dynamic 
relations between state institutions, private firms and civil society actors. Given the intensification and 
unpredictability of global challenges, the increase of political violence, terrorist activism, rapid climate 
change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values and rise of authoritarianism, we highlight the importance 
for management and organizational scholars to further engage with our conceptualization of organized 
violence and develop an interdisciplinary research agenda fit for an uncertain future.
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Table 1 – Relations between core tensions and pressures, challenges in the governance triangle and doomsday scenarios
Exemplary narratives from the literature Core tensions and pressures Leading to core challenges Propositions on firm-
state-civil society 
relations of organized 
violence
Leading to doomsday 
scenarios
“ […] Over the past decade, many governments have found it increasingly 
difficult to recruit enough qualified uniformed personnel for combat and 
post-conflict operations. They have consequently come to depend more and 
more on Private Military Corps (PMC) and Private Security Corps (PSC) for 
training, repair, and maintenance of weapons systems and vehicles; 
collection of intelligence information; interrogation of prisoners of war; asset 
protection; and support of troops and police personnel in operational theatres. 
As a result, thousands of PMCs and PSCs, keen to cash in on this new market, 
have rapidly emerged. Contractors are hired to provide support before and 
during wars and, increasingly, to assist with post-war programs.”
(Wulf, 2011: 139)
“The private management of prisons has become a hotly debated issue in 
many countries across the world, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, 
the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Some of these 
countries have a long history of privately managed prisons of one sort or 
another stretching back into the nineteenth century and beyond.” (Alonso 
and Andrew, 2016 : 236)
1/ Increased economic and 
social incentives to ‘privatize’ 
and liberalize the monopoly of 
violence (Kinsey, 2006; 
Alonso & Andrews, 2016; 
McFate, 2017)
2/ Limited capacity to 
challenge any violation of laws 
or state deliberating tolerating 
it (Volkov, 2016)
A/ State confronted with 
increasing trade-offs on which 
public assets to manage 
(Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen 
& Williams, 2010)
B/ State has limited 
resources/capabilities/willingness 
to maintain or re-establish a 
monopoly of organised violence 
(Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov, 
2016; Crawford & Botchwey, 
2017)
P1a: Outsourcing of 
violence and security to 
firms
State  Firms
“Major elements of China’s strategy in the region, such as increased 
migration of Han and increased state control/management of ethnic minority 
religious and cultural expression, have been major ongoing sources of 
Uyghur grievance against the state. The state’s response to this has consisted 
of alternating periods of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies toward ethnic minority 
religious and cultural expression.” (Clarke, 2010: 545)
“The declaration of a ‘war on terror’ marked the most obvious, but by no 
means the only response to the rise in international terrorism. Immediately 
after the attacks of 11 September 2001, governments started to overhaul their 
countries’ systems of anti-terrorist legislation.” (Epifanio, 2011: 399)
“[…] efforts to implement the intervention of the executive branch of the 
state also involved the use of force via police action. For example, at 
Caimanes [Chile] the police broke up a roadblock with the use of riot control 
gear, and then demolished the campsite in March 2015, on day 76 of protest. 
The roadblock was organized in protest at the absence of any action after the 
supreme court ruling in October in 2014 requesting Pelambres to disassemble 
the El Mauro tailings dam. Members of the community told us that such 
intervention was really a form of protecting the interests of the company 
instead of complying with the court order to dismantle the El Mauro dam.” 
(Maher et al., 2019: 1181)
“This police practice of planting weapons on protestors once in custody was 
common during the Tía Maria conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet 
1/ Increase or persistence of 
political instability and social 
unrest  (Clarke, 2010; 
Beckman, 2016)
2/ Response to exogenous 
shocks (e.g. climate change, 
terrorist attacks, conflicts with 
other state(s) or internal 
guerrillas, pandemics) 
(Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 
2016)
A/ State pursues a political 
agenda to repress minorities/ 
supress human/ democratic rights 
(Dunlap, 2019; Maher et al., 
2019)
B/ State needs to quickly react to 
unforeseen circumstances/events 
(Epifanio, 2011)
P1b: Deployment of 
state armies and 
security forces
State  Civil society
D1: Rise of military 
dictatorships






























































Southern Copper Peru, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, already began 
assessing the mineral reserve situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley 
in 2000.” (Dunlap, 2019: 11)
“Under the conditions in Russia in the mid-1990s, where the boundaries 
between public and private violence became blurred, when the de facto 
capacity to enforce and thereby define justice gained priority over written 
laws, when protection and taxation were increasingly privatized, the very 
existence of t the state as a unified entity and of the public domain itself was 
called into question.” (Volkov, 2016:7)
“The additional profits from the [Italian] Mafia's economic activities in the 
legal sector that created the capital reserves that in turn made possible its 
entrance as a major player in the international drug trade in the 1970s and 
1980s. It is striking that a substantial portion of these capital reserves can be 
traced directly to Mafia penetration of the public administration. [..] The 
1970s and 1980s, however, were characterized by the growing political 
autonomy of the Mafia, which formed 'Mafia-political lobbies' to advance its 
interests and at times directly assumed positions of political and 
administrative power at the local level (Chubb, 1996: 275-276)
“[…] thanks to the inherently transnational character of the Internet, the 
physical location of criminal actors is less important than it was before, 
providing them with the possibility to operate in countries where there are 
loopholes in legislation and security that can be exploited or to easily 
connect with distant criminal peers” (Lavorgna, 2015: 156)
1/ Increased interest of 
organised crime to control 
socio-economic 
activities/assets in key regions 
or sectors, due to weak/fragile 
political and institutional 
conditions (Riccardi, 2014; 
Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016)
2/ Increased capacity of 
organised crime/violent 
organizations to influence 
political arenas and institutions 
(Beckert & Wehinger, 2012; 
Albanese, 2014; Kilby, 2013)
A/ Private firms control  specific 
geographical areas or economic 
sectors since the state lacks 
resource and/or capabilities 
(Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012; 
Lavorgna, 2015)
B/ Private firms share or take 
over  the political and economic 
control of certain areas/societal 
groups in agreement with the 
State (or some of its 
representatives) (Volkov, 2016; 




“‘Security authorities, following Brigadier General Kitson's (1971/2010) 
advice, have come to view opposition in different stages of proto-insurgent 
activity: the ‘preparatory period’ and ‘non-violence phase,’ which are viewed 
as precursors to an ‘insurgency’ that challenges the legitimacy and operations 
of governments and resource extraction companies. This leads authorities to 
respond with various pre-emptive and sustained efforts, mixing concession 
and coercion to defuse social movements and their consequent disruptions of 
business. It is from this perspective that we analyse the operations of 
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE), looking at how so-called 
‘insurgency’ is defined and how governments and companies collaborate to 
legitimise their operations and ‘pacify’ opposition (Brock and Dunlap, 2018: 
35)
“When resistance against the proposed mine emerged in Niyamgiri [India], 
both the corporation and state responded with counter-mobilization efforts 
in an attempt to quell opposition to the mine. […] Two black jeeps driven 
by pro-Vedanta ‘goons’ regularly traversed the mountains and some 
Vedanta supporters even occupied a hut in a Dongria Kondh village to 
demonstrate their continued presence and intimidate villagers. Pro-
corporate ‘thugs’ appeared in villages and at resistance meetings, 
intimidating attendees and those who spoke out against the mine. The 
heavy-handed tactics and violence by various pro-corporate actors are well 
documented by international NGOs, building on information gathered with 
the support of local and NAN activists” (Kraemer et al., 2013: 841)
1/ Increased interest of private 
businesses to control socio-
economic activities/assets in 
key regions or sectors 
(Sullivan et al., 2011; Kraemer 
et al., 2013)
2/ Response to social unrest, 
political instability and 
institutional uncertainty (Brock 
and Dunlap, 2018)
A/ Private firms are legally 
entitled and legitimised to exert 
monopoly of violence in certain 
regions or sectors (Newell, 2005; 
Banerjee, 2011b; Sampat, 2015)
B/ Private firms receive 
economic and political powers 
from the state as part of a 
political agenda (Brock & 
Dunlap, 2018)
P2b: Deployment of 
private security forces 
and division of 
resistance
Firms  Civil society 
D2: Rise of private 
security monopolies 
and oligopolies






























































“[…] warlords, organized crime, militias, rebels, and even youth gangs and 
child soldiers have increasingly fought in wars and violent conflicts” (Wulf, 
2011: 138)
 “In Pakistan, the central state in Islamabad has little control of the “tribal 
areas” such as Waziristan. Similarly, the Iraqi state in Baghdad exercises 
little authority in Kurdistan. In the case of Pakistan, the tribal areas have 
existed since the formation of the country in 1947, and even though they 
have been largely out of the control of the central state, they have also been 
represented within it. Under the 1973 Constitution the tribal areas had eight 
representatives in the National Assembly elected by the tribal elders (the 
Maliks). Under General Musharraf’s regime this was increased to twelve. In 
Iraq, while the peshmerga militia control the streets of Mosul, a coalition of 
Kurdish political parties keeps the government in power in Baghdad 
(Acemoglu et al., 2013; p:6)
1/ Increased political, cultural 
and religious struggles in 
society between classes, 
groups or regional minorities 
(Sandbrook & Romano, 2004; 
Acemoglu et al., 2013)
2/ Raise of economic 
inequality and social unrest, 
collective fear or distrust for 
public authorities and political 
organizations (Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010)
A/ Groups in society, minorities 
question the state capacity or 
legitimacy to maintain and 
enforce a shared social contract 
(Duyvesteyn, 2004; Gupta, 2008; 
Khalil, 2013)
B/ Unclear distinction between 
state and violent civil society 
group in the control of violence 
(Shah; 2006)
P3a: Guerrilla warfare 
and terrorist 
organizations 
Civil society  State
“[..] the majority of Hamas’s resources were spent (prior to their 2006 
election victory) on the social and welfare programs that the movement 
provides to the Palestinians. […] The Nepali Maoists similarly employed a 
wide range of nonviolent methods with the aim of generating support 
during their “People’s War.” They lowered rents in their areas of influence, 
and in certain cases even fulfilled their promise to redistribute “land to the 
tiller.” They also undertook campaigns in support of female inheritance 
rights and employment, and in opposition to polygamy, prostitution, and 
domestic violence. In addition, they provided community justice, with a 
focus on crimes such as corruption, rape, and murder.” (Khalil, 2013: 422-
423)
“In April 2014, Bembe armed fighters assaulted the town of Misisi, a 
burgeoning artisanal gold mining site located in Fizi territory in South Kivu 
province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Getting close to 
the compound of CASA Minerals, a Virgin Islands incorporated company 
engaged in gold exploration, the assailants framed their attack as a protest 
against the alleged sale to CASA of ‘their’ hill, the gold-rich Akyanga 
Mountain, seen as part of the Babembe’s ancestral grounds. He presented 
this action as a way to express disapproval with Banro’s alleged surpassing 
of its concession limits, and the derisory compensation offered to 
expropriated peasants. At the face of it, these actions constitute violent 
reactions against the intensifying expansion of industrial mining in the 
eastern Congo, which threatens the livelihoods and ways of life of hundreds 
of thousands of people depending both directly and indirectly on artisanal 
mining”  (Verweijen, 2017: 466-467)
1/ Increased needs for social 
and economic justice / fairness 
or political representation in 
response to firms exploitation 
of public assets (Taylor, 2011; 
Verweijen, 2017)
2/ Response to scandals or 
misconducts perpetrated by 
private businesses (Obi, 2010; 
Pedersen, 2014)
A/ Civil society actors ensure 
and provide social security, 
income redistribution, voice, and  
‘safety nets’ to citizens in 
opposition to the state (Khalil, 
2013; Gerber, 2011; Lyons & 
Westoby, 2014)
B/ Civil society actors  control 
and monitor of private 
businesses’ operations due to 
lack of capacity or interest from 
the state (Verweijen, 2017)
P3b: Mobilization of 
violent resistance
Civil society  Firms
D3: Rise of civil wars
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